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Introduction
The expanded use of telecommunications monitoring and re-
cording devices in the workplace has incited an impassioned
controversy.1 At odds are employees' privacy interest2 in their
1. The controversy is part of a perceived decline in ethical behavior both in and
out of the workplace. See, e.g., Executives and General Public Say Ethical Behavior I
Declining in U.S., Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1983, at 33, col. 3. A Gallup Poll commissioned
by the Wall Street Journal indicated 65% of those individuals surveyed (general pub-
lic citizens and business executives) think the overall level of ethics in American soci-
ety has declined in the past decade while only 9% say it has risen. Id. The poll found
that 49% of the general public, as compared with only 23% of business executives,
believed ethic standards in business had declined. Furthermore, 78% of the execu-
tives, compared with 15% of the general public, stated they had used a company tele-
phone for unauthorized personal long-distance calls. Id. This divergence between
belief and behavior indicates a possible "double-standard" in the workplace. There
are also potential adverse physical side-effects to workplace monitoring. Employer
Eavesdropping, 73 A.B.A. J. 24-25 (1987) ("Employees in monitored jobs suffer in-
creased levels of stress-related illnesses like ulcers, heart disease, anxiety, fatigue,
high blood pressure, diabetes and depression.").
2. The term "privacy" is vague and highly emotive. Many commentators have
made efforts at defining privacy and its various components. See, e.g., S. BOI,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10-11 (1982) (privacy is
"the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others - either physical
access, personal information, or attention"); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
231 (1981) (author discusses three meanings of privacy: secrecy, seclusion, and auton-
omy). An employee's particular privacy interest in workplace communications on a
company phone is primarily a "secrecy" interest defined as the withholding or con-
cealment of information or personal facts from others. Id at 231.
Companies or individuals may attempt to obtain information about a person's af-
fairs so they can gain a personal, social, or economic advantage. For example,
"[p]rying enables one to form a more accurate picture of a friend or colleague, and the
knowledge gained is useful in social or professional dealings with him." Id. at 232.
One state has enacted a provision prohibiting employer "prying." See MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 423.508 (West 1987) (prohibiting employer from creating a record of em-
ployee's "non-employment activities" unless authorized by the employee or occurring
in the workplace). Withholding or concealing personal information allows a person to
control other people's opinions about that person. This secrecy interest, however,
does not appear to be absolute. For example, when the information an employee at-
tempts to keep secret from his employer directly affects a legitimate business interest,
the business's interest may override the employee's secrecy interest. See, e.g., Briggs
v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (employer monitoring phone
conversation of employee leaking confidential information). Conversational privacy
also increases the informational content of personal communications by increasing a
speaker's brevity and informality. R. POSNER, Supra, at 247. The lack of such privacy
imposes costs in the form of (1) greater deliberation time in deciding what to say to
prevent disclosing personal information or offending someone else; and (2) reduction
in precision and lucidity of thought. Id. at 245.
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workplace communications and businesses' interest in reducing
the costs associated with employee misuse of their telecommu-
nications system.3 These conflicting values are evidenced in
the dramatic increase in employee suits alleging invasion of pri-
vacy by employers.4 In addition, employee organizations are
lobbying legislators to pass laws eliminating all or most forms
of wire and electronic surveillance.5 Employers counter that
employee monitoring methods are necessary to maintain their
companies' competitive viability.6 They point out that em-
ployee supervision has always been a business's responsibility
whether to improve worker performance or to prevent malin-
gering or theft.7 The advent of modern scientific management
theory,' along with newly developed monitoring technologies,9
3. One poll addressed the ethical issue of how large the costs of unauthorized
telephone use must be before business executives become concerned. Ricklefs; Execu-
tives Apply Stiffer Standards Than Public to Ethical Dilemmas, Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1983, at 33, col. 4. The Gallup Poll asked whether an employee who discovers that a
fellow employee has been sneaking $100 of unauthorized calls per month should re-
port the employee to the company. Seventy-six percent of business executives indi-
cated the employee should be reported while 19% favored disregarding the matter.
The figures for the general public were 64% and 26% respectively. When the amount
of calls was $10 per month, however, the figures fell to 48% and 47% respectively for
business executives and 47% and 38% respectively for the general public. Id.
4. See generally, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SURVEILLANCE,
AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY (BNA) 107-46
(1987) (special report compiling cases involving workplace privacy issues).
5. See, e.g., "Don't Bug Me" (Communications Workers of America Fights for
Passage of a Bill Prohibiting Secret Electronic Monitoring of Workers Using Com-
puters or Telephones), Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 5. Currently, Congress is
considering passage of a "beep bill" which would require that telephone monitoring
by employers be accompanied by an audible warning tone. See infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
6. The business justifications for monitoring activities focus on increasing the
economic efficiency of providing goods and services to the public. Call monitoring
allows a business to increase or maintain customer satisfaction through the use of
employee performance checks. Second, it enables businesses to identify and develop
areas in which customers seek further assistance, such as additional telephone serv-
ices and new product development. Knowing what its customers demand is critical to
a business's survival.
7. See, e.g., Brophy, Putting Social Calls on Hold; Bosses Have a New Weapon in
Fighting Phone Bills, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 29, 1986, at 54-55. Apparently,
employee misuse of the company's telephone system is very common. One estimate of
the percentage of calls not related to work ranges from 10% to 30% at private compa-
nies. Id. at 54. In addition, a government survey found that 29% to 50% of long dis-
tance calls by employees were personal rather than business. Id.
8. Scientific management theories, which focus on increasing worker productiv-
ity through techniques such as time and motion studies, have become popular meth-
ods of facilitating managerial control.
9. See, eg., Budiansky, Cheaper Electronics Makes It a Snap to Snoop, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., May 18 1987, at 54 (new technology makes it possible to tap phone
1988]
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makes it inevitable that the already pervasive monitoring and
recording of telephone communications in the workplace will
increase.10
Private businesses that want to monitor or record workplace
telephone messages are subject to numerous perils under both
federal and state law. Federal wiretapping laws" and Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) rules 2 regulate the cir-
cumstances and methods by which recording or monitoring
may occur. The federal wiretapping laws, though primarily di-
rected at government law enforcement activities, also apply to
surveillance activities conducted by businesses or individuals.
These laws, however, have statutory exceptions which permit
the monitoring or recording of communications "within the or-
dinary course of business"'" or when one or more parties con-
sent.' 4 Federal courts have inconsistently interpreted these
exceptions, with some courts emphasizing the lessened privacy
expectations of the telephone users,'5 and other courts empha-
sizing that the workplace communications "were in the ordi-
nary course of business."' This uncertainty blurs the
permissible limits of business monitoring in various
jurisdictions.
A person's general right to privacy is left largely to the law of
lines without physical penetration into wire). High-Tech Big Brother, Sci. Am., Jan.
1986, at 60 (citing examples of the "virtual revolution in the technology relevant to
electronic surveillance").
10. An estimated 15 million workers are potentially subject to electronic work-
place monitoring, according to the Communications Workers of America. See Em-
ployer Eavesdropping, 73 A.B.A. J. 24 (1987). Many of these employees are telephone
sales representatives or employees of telecommunications service providers. Another
indication of this expansive trend is the increased sales of station message detail re-
cording (SMDR) devices, which allow the programmed monitoring and recording of
calls on business systems. In 1985, over 20,000 SMDR and related systems were sold
in the United States. See Marx & Sherizen, Corporations That Spy on Their Employ-
ees, 60 Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Winter 1987, at 32. Because the cost of surveillance tech-
nology is declining rapidly, more businesses will purchase and use such devices.
Budiansky, supra note 9, at 54-56.
11. See infra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
12. The FCC has adamantly upheld its position as protector of individual privacy
interests in interstate communications despite a preemption issue lurking in the back-
ground of its most recent rule regarding permissible recording methods. See infra
notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 73-113 and accompanying text (discussing the "context" and
"content" approaches courts use to analyze the ordinary course of business ex-
ception).
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the individual states.17 Some states have constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, or common law that protect individual privacy
interests. 8 Generally, these laws are more expansive and pro-
tective of a person's privacy expectations than federal laws.
Florida, for example, has a stringent requirement that all par-
ties to a communication must consent before monitoring or re-
cording can be accomplished. 9 In addition, state public service
commissions impose tariff provisions on telephone companies,
requiring them to discontinue service to businesses that engage
in prohibited methods of surveillance.20 The net result is an
interlocking and overlapping web of federal and state laws
which limits the extent to which businesses may monitor and
record intrastate and interstate telephone communications on
their phone systems.
This article analyzes the federal and state laws2' that limit
the extent to which a private employer may monitor -2 or rec-
ord23 phone messages transmitted or received on the em-
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
18. See generally Note, Toward A Right of Privacy As A Matter of State Constitu-
tional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977) (overview of states having "free-standing"
right of privacy and right of privacy explicitly or implicitly in unreasonable search
and seizure provisions). See also infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing
state constitutional provisions); notes 161-208 and accompanying text (discussing state
statutory provisions).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 1985). See discussion inifra notes 193-202
and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
21. This article discusses federal statutory law and administrative regulations.
See infra notes 29-151 and accompanying text. In addition, Florida constitutional,
statutory and administrative provisions are included as examples of state law.
State tort law protections based on invasion of privacy claims are not discussed in
detail. Prior to the enactment of state statutory provisions, state tort law had tradi-
tionally been used to protect the wrongful interception of private workplace commu-
nications. The principle that the wrongful intrusion into physical solitude or se-
clusion violates the right of privacy has been extended by many courts to include
eavesdropping on private conversations. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, P. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 854-55 (5th ed. 1984). For an over-
view of the tort law applicable to wiretapping, see generally Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 3D
1296 (1967 & Supp. 1987) (annotation of eavesdropping as a violation of the right of
privacy).
22. "Monitoring" refers to listening in on others' wire communications contempo-
raneously by means of a wiretap device. The situation where an individual listens to a
recordation of a wire communication at a later time is included within the definition
of "recording." See infi note 23.
23. "Recording" means the act of using a device to acquire and reproduce the
sounds contained in a wire communication. Under the various statutes, unauthorized
recording is actionable even though there is no use or disclosure of the contents of the
recorded conversation. See infra notes 34, 145-54 and accompanying text.
1988]
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ployer's telecommunications system.24 In particular, situations
where employers use monitoring or recording as a service qual-
ity assurance measure or to prevent unauthorized use are con-
sidered. The article examines tensions between FCC rules and
the federal and state wiretapping statutes with particular em-
phasis on the "ordinary course of business" and "participant
consent" exceptions. The article then analyzes cases in which
courts attempt to interpret statutes that sometimes seem incon-
gruous.2 A brief analysis of a proposed federal "beeper" bill is
also presented.2 The article includes some recommendations




A. Omnibus and Privacy Acts
The primary federal wiretapping statute is the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19682 (Omnibus Act),
which was amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy
24. This article's analysis is limited to private employers. In cases involving pub-
lic employers, the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures would also apply. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987). Balancing
the government's need for supervision, control, and efficiency in the workplace
against employees' privacy rights, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
standard of reasonableness for evaluating searches of public employees' offices by
their employers would not unduly burden government employers' interests nor au-
thorize arbitrary intrusions upon public employees' privacy rights. Id, at 1502.
25. Judge Arthur Goldberg, attempting to interpret the federal wiretapping stat-
ute, said the following-
We might wish we had planted a powerful electronic bug in a Congressional
ante chamber to garner every clue concerning Title III [the federal wiretap-
ping statute], for we are once again faced with the troublesome task of an
interstitial interpretation of an amorphous Congressional enactment. Even a
clear bright beam of statutory language can be obscured by the mirror of
Congressional intent. Here, we must divine the will of Congress when all
recorded signs point to less than full reflection. But, alas, we lack any sophis-
ticated sensor of Congressional whispers, and are remitted to more primitive
tools. With them, we can only hope to measure Congress' general clime. So
we engage our windvane and barometer and seek to measure the direction of
the Congressional vapors and the pressures fomenting them. Our search for
lightning bolts of comprehension traverses a fog of inclusions and exclusions
which obscures both the parties' burdens and the ultimate goal.
Briggs v. American Air Filter, Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980). The issues in this
article should be read with Judge Goldberg's message in mind.
26. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-25 (1987).
[Vol. 10:715
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Act of 1986e (Privacy Act). The Omnibus Act creates and de-
fines the federal eavesdropping' ° and wiretappings1 causes of
action. Because its original provisions relate to the means of
communication prevalent in 1968, the Act originally failed to
cover many of the newly developed and sophisticated electronic
means of communication.32 The Privacy Act was passed to
rectify this problem by modifying various provisions of the
Omnibus Act. In particular, the Privacy Act expanded protec-
tion to "electronic" communications as well as wire or oral
communications. 3 The Omnibus Act proscribes the illegal
interception,3 disclosure," or use6 of a wire,87
29. Pub. L. No. 99-508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-3126 (1987)).
30. The term "eavesdropping" is sometimes used to describe "all forms of artifi-
cial surveillance. of communications." See C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVES-
DROPPING 4-5 (1978). However, "eavesdropping," as used in this article, refers to any
form of nonconsensual surveillance of oral communications other than wiretapping.
This definition conforms to what one commentator terms "bugging." Id, See also J.
CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.01(1][a] - [b] (1977) (bugging refers
to overhearing, broadcasting, or recording a speaker's conversation). Generally,
eavesdropping activity involves the use of an electronic device that enables a listener
to hear a conversation without tangible penetration into either a wire or the physical
area where the conversation occurs. See Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Work-
place: The Need for Standarda, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 438, 439 n.9 (1984).
31. "WIretapping" generally refers to physical entry into a telephone circuit to
intercept a conversation. See Note, supra note 30, at 439. Some methods of surveil-
lance do not fit squarely within the definitions of eavesdropping or wiretapping. For
example, induction coils allow the interception of wire communications without phys-
ical entry into a phone system,
32. Wiley & Leibowitz, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
Moves Privacy Protection Towards the 21st Century, 4 TELEMATICS 2 (Feb. 1987).
33. For simplification, references hereafter to the Omnibus Act refer to the 1968
Act including the Privacy Act amendments.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1987). The term intercept is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (1987); see infra text accompanying note 56.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (1987).
36. Id § 2511(1)(d). This section, which prohibits the use of the content f an
unlawf'ully intercepted communication, should not be confused with section
2511(1)(b), which prohibits the use of particular devices
37. A "wire communication" means:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for
the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including
the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by
any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmis-
sion of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage
of such communication, but such term does not include the radio portion of a
cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless
telephone handset and the base unit.
I § 2510(1).
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oral s8 or electronic 9 communication.' A prima facie violation
would be: 1) defendant's intentional or willful; 2) interception,
disclosure or use; of 3) plaintiff's wire, oral or electronic com-
munication; whose 4) interception occurred on the premises of
a business the operation of which affected interstate com-
merce.41 Because of the surreptitious nature of the wiretapping
tort, courts have generally set forth lenient evidentiary stan-
dards that plaintiffs must meet to get a wiretapping case to a
38. An "oral communication" means "any oral communication uttered by a per-
son exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any
electronic communication." Id. § 2510(2).
39. An "electronic communication" means:
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate commerce, or
foreign commerce, but does not include:
(A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is trans-
mitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;
(B) any wire or oral communication;
(C) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or
(D) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117
of this title).
Id. § 2510(12).
40. . § 2511.
41. United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839,847 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
871 (1980). Since Congress intended to prohibit electronic eavesdropping to the full
extent of its constitutional authority, the Omnibus Act applies to most, if not all, in-
trastate phone communications. Id at 854-55. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S.
96, 104-05 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327-29 (1939) (inability of the
parties to distinguish between interstate and intrastate communications).
In some situations, a plaintiff may file a claim based on state law alleging the de-
fendant unlawfully monitored an interstate phone call. In this situation, the issue
arises regarding which state's wiretapping laws apply. For example, in Becker v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), a former employee
brought suit for wrongful termination. Through discovery, the defendant-employer
discovered that the plaintiff had secretly made tape recordings of conversations be-
tween the plaintiff in Texas and the defendant's employees in California. The court
found that under Texas law, there is no remedy for the surreptitious recordation of
telephone conversations where only one party to the conversation consents. Under
California law, however, the court felt that all-party consent is required. The plaintiff
urged that enforcement of the California law would violate Texas public policy. The
court stated that "[t]he fact that the State of California has sought to protect its citi-
zens' rights to privacy to a greater degree than the State of Texas... does not provide
a sufficient basis to support a finding that the California statute violates" the public
policy of Texas. Id at 703. The court then held that under Texas choice-of-law analy-
sis, which uses a "most significant relationship" test, the California law should apply.
ld. at 703-06. The court relied upon various sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 & 152 (1971) which provides the structure for choice-of-
law analysis in such situations.
1988] WORKPLACE WIRETAPPING
jury.4 Courts generally will allow a case to survive motions for
a directed verdict or summary judgment even if there is only
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's involvement.43
The Act's use and disclosure prohibitions apply to business
only when a company using or disclosing a communication
knew or had reason to know that the communication was inter-
cepted in violation of the Act." The Act itself does not address
the use or disclosure of lawfully intercepted communications.
For example, a business may legitimately monitor communica-
tions on its phone system under the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception to the Act. In such a case, there is no
"interception" in violation of the Omnibus Act. The business
would have a qualified privilege to internally use the content of
the communication for a proper business purpose. However,
the business may be subject to liability under state tort law the-
ories for improperly using or disclosing the contents of the
monitored communication for a non-business purpose.4- Defa-
mation and invasion of privacy claims could result from public
disclosure of particular communications involving employees
or other persons." The most common situations would irivolve
employers monitoring the communications of employees 47 or
42. Courts disagree on whether a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defend-
ant illegally intercepted plaintiff's specific communication. Some courts only require
a general showing that the defendant engaged in wiretapping activities. Awbrey v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. Ga. 1980); cf. Oliver v. Pac.
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 632 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Or. 1981).
43. See Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785 (11th Cir. 1987) (court addressed the issue of
the amount and type of evidence a plaintiff must produce to withstand a directed
verdict). See also Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (grant of sum-
mary judgment improper where genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
employer's recording of employee's telephone call was in ordinary course of business);
f MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 750.539i (West Supp. 1987) (proof of installation of inter-
cepting device is prima fade evidence of violation).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) - (d) (1987).
45. See Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 360-62, 696 P.2d 637, 640-41, 212 Cal. Rptr.
143, 146-47 (1985) (making a distinction between first-hand dissemination of informa-
tion, which the wiretap laws govern, and second-hand repetitions, which state tort law
governs). Cf Ky. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 526.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (inadver-
tent overhearing of a communication without later divulging its contents is not an
eavesdropping violation).
46. The "public disclosure of private facts" breach of privacy tort might apply in
certain situations. See Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
47. See i& (employee's action against former employer for invasion of privacy not
supported by evidence of willful use in violation of Omnibus Act); Awbrey v. Great
AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (employees not required to pro-
duce evidence of specific instances of eavesdropping, general allegations of employer
installing wiretap sufficient to maintain action); Bianco v. American Broadcasting
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customers that call the business."
The Act also prohibits the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device to intercept any oral communication in particu-
lar situations.49 Criminal violators are subject to fine and/or
imprisonment up to five years.50 Additionally, the Act autho-
rizes a civil action 51 to recover compensatory damages, 5 puni-
tive damages,5 attorney's fees and other litigation costs.5
1. "Extension Phone" and "Ordinary Course
of Business" Exceptions
The prima facie case encompasses an extremely broad range
of communications, including a number of legitimate business
activities. Under the Act, however, definitions of particular
key terms create exceptions in certain situations.55 Specifically,
the Act defines the term "intercept" as the "aural or other ac-
Co., 470 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (employer's electronic eavesdropping did not vio-
late state constitution, which did not apply to private eavesdropping); Simmons v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392 (D. Okla. 1978) (telephone company em-
ployee not entitled to recover for company's monitoring activities because warning
about personal calls and notice of monitoring was given).
48. See, e.g., Awbrey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(individual who called employee at work on line the employer tapped has a cause of
action despite not being an employee).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b) (1987).
50. 1& § 2511(4).
51. Id. § 2520. Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication was un-
lawfully intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used may recover damages in a civil
action from the person or entity which engaged in the violation. Id Private remedies
under the Omnibus Act supersede any private remedies contained in 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1982). Congress did not intend duplicative remedies, since section 605, which prohib-
its the interception and divulgence of wire and radio communications, was extensively
revised by the Omnibus Act. Watkins v. L.M. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577, 580 (11th Cir.
1983). The civil statute of limitations is two years after the date upon which the claim-
ant first had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e)
(1987).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (b)(2) (1987). The measure of damages, exclusive of punitive
damages, is the greater of actual damages plus profits made by the violator as a result
of the violation or statutory damages (the greater of $100 per day for each day of the
violation or $10,000). Id. § 2520(c)(2)(A) - (B). This measure of damages is consistent
with the tort in some states, which permits the recovery of punitive damages without
recovery of actual damages. See, e.g., Scalise v. National Util. Serv., 120 F.2d 938 (5th
Cir. 1941) (rule in Florida and federal courts is that an award of punitive damages
only requires that plaintiff be subject to a deliberate wrongful act). The theory is that
the invasion of a plaintiff's privacy interest is by itself a harmful act requiring com-
pensation despite the lack of actual monetary loss.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(2) (1987).
54. 1d § 2520(b)(3).
55. The flow chart in Diagram One in the Appendix illustrates the various paths
to Omnibus Act liability or exceptions.
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quisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral commu-
nication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other
device.' ' 4 Both eavesdropping and wiretapping offenses re-
quire that a plaintiff demonstrate the defendant illegally "in-
tercepted" plaintiff's communication by using an "electronic,
mechanical or other device." Absent proof that the defendant
used a statutorily defined "intercepting device," the plaintiff
fails to establish a violation.
An intercepting device may be any "electronic, mechanical,
or other device." '57 However, the definition excludes:
any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, furnished to the subscriber or user
by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in
the ordinary course of its business and being used by the sub-
scriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or fur-
nished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its
business.s
This provision, termed the "extension phone" or "ordinary
course of business" exception, ostensibly excepts particular de-
vices but actually excepts particular activities.59 Facially, the
statute seems to require that a defendant demonstrate that a
purported interception be both in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and by means of an authorized device.
The typical monitoring method employers use is an exten-
sion phone or other similar device. Cases involving the use of
extension phones generally conclude that recording a private
conversation without the employee's consent6° is not within the
"ordinary course of business. Some courts, however, hold
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1987).
57. Id § 2510(5).
58. Id § 2510(5)(a). Notable is that the statute excepts the use of devices provided
by either a provider of wire or electronic communication services or the subscriber
itself. Thus, under the Omnibus Act, the subscriber can purchase a monitoring
or recording device from businesses other than the telephone company. However,
the Florida Security of Communications Act, discussed infra notes 163-210 and accom-
panying text, does not include this option. C. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-
A:1(IV)(a)(2) (1974), which provides that a phone or other instrument is not an inter-
cepting device if purchased, rented or used by the subscriber or user.
59. These exceptions are theoretically and analytically different from one an-
other, although courts tend to refer to them synonymously.
60. An employer's use of an extension phone may be permissible under the Omni-
bus Act's participant consent exception, discussed infra notes 193-202 and accompany-
ing text.
61. See, e.g, United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974). Harpel
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that the Omnibus Act exempts interceptions made with exten-
sion phones because they are not "intercepting" devices within
the meaning of the statute.62 This latter perspective conflicts
with the principle that the application of the Omnibus Act
"should not turn on the type of equipment that is used, but
whether the privacy of telephone conversations has been in-
vaded in a manner offensive to the words and intent of the
Act." s In the business context, the better view accords with
this principle: an interception by means of an extension phone
(or other permissible device) must also be in "the ordinary
course of business" for the statutory exception to apply." An
employer cannot engage in nonconsensual surveillance and in-
vade employees' privacy interests by simply using an extension
phone.
Employees' expectations of privacys may often depend on
the type of telecommunications device on which they are com-
municating. For example, the privacy interests in a communi-
cation on a speaker-phone in an open office are less than those
in a communication on an extension phone in a private office.66
But an employer must minimize the secrecy of any surveillance
in order to conform with the Omnibus Act's "ordinary course of
business" exception.6 7 Thus, an employer conducting surveil-
lance on an extension, speaker, or other type of phone with
reduced privacy must eliminate the surreptitiousness of
the surveillance by acquiring the parties' consent, particularly
where a communication may be "personal" rather than "busi-
implicitly incorporates the federal participant consent exception into the ordinary
course of business exception. See ifra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
62. See United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (de-
partment store's chief of security, suspecting employee involvement in criminal activi-
ties, intercepted calls through a specially installed extension phone).
63. Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979).
64. See, e.g., Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (sur-
reptitious monitoring of an employee's conversation is permissible if the conversation
is business related); James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979)
(monitoring of business calls to assist employee training within ordinary course of
business exception); U.S. v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974) (use of extension
phone without any party's consent is not within the ordinary course of business excep-
tion). Most states are in accord with this latter principle. See, e.g., Ribas v. Clark, 154
Cal. App. 3d 1007, 696 P.2d 637, 201 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1984).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. See State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1980) (detective's testimony re-
garding a conversation he overheard while listening in on a speaker-phone without
the caller's knowledge admissible; however, tape recording held inadmissible).
67. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (discussing the contextual ap-




A phone cbnversation within the "ordinary course of busi-
ness exception" may be a business call or, in some limited situa-
tions, a personal call. For example, monitoring sales
representatives' calls as a means of improving sales techniques
is permissible, such calls being business communications.69
Also, a supervisor may legitimately monitor the conversation of
an employee whom he suspects is divulging business secrets to
competitors, even though such a call could be termed per-
sonal.70 However, employers may intercept a personal call only
to the extent necessary to determine if it is of a business or
personal nature.7" There is some disagreement concerning
where the borderline between business and personal calls
should be. Courts analyzing this problem generally state that a
business call must be "reasonably related to a business pur-
pose."72 The next section presents an analysis of the methods
courts use in addressing these issues.
2. Case Synopses
The relatively few cases interpreting the Omnibus Act's ordi-
nary course of business exception fail to take a consistent ap-
proach in analyzing the exception. However, a number of cases
provide useful insights into the factors courts consider signifi-
cant in deciding the lawfulness of employers' actions in moni-
toring or recording communications in the workplace. In these
cases, courts primarily take one of two analytical approaches in
deciding whether to impose liability for employer surveillance.
The context approach focuses on whether the context of the
employer's surveillance is proper. The content approach in-
68. See infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
69. Watkins v. LM. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
70. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980). The court went
even further, stating that "[the] interception of calls reasonably suspected to involve
non-business matters [is] Justifiable [if] the employer has had difficulty controlling the
personal use of business equipment through prior warnings." Id. at 420 n.8. Judge
Thomas A. Clark concurred in the court's judgement except for the statement in foot-
note 8. Judge Clark stated that a private call, such as the one described in the foot-
note, could not be intercepted. Id at 421 (Clark, J., concurring).
71. Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 416 (11th Cir. 1986); Watkins v. LM.
Berry & Co, 704 F.2d 577, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1983).
72. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980); James v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581-82 (10th Cir. 1979) (installation of moni-
toring device with notice to employees was for "legitimate business purpose" of train-
ing employees and controlling abusive customer phone calls).
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quires whether the employer has an interest in acquiring the
content of a particular phone communication. The following
sections use this taxonomy in presenting a synopsis of the perti-
nent monitoring and recording cases. Note, however, that a
few of the cases include analyses from both the context and
content approaches.
a. Context Approach
The context approach emphasizes factors such as whether
there are (1) adequate business justifications for the surveil-
lance; (2) proper notification to employees; and (3) congruity
between announced procedural safeguards and their actual ad-
ministration. The general rule is that employers will not be lia-
ble for interceptions if they meet a checklist of objective
factors.
Use of the context approach to analyze whether a communi-
cation is within the ordinary course of business exception is
anomalous in one major respect. The exception only applies to
wire communications which do not require that speakers have
a subjective expectation of privacy. The nonconsensual inter-
ception of a wire communication is itself actionable regardless
of whether the speakers believed their conversation was pri-
vate. The context approach, nevertheless, incorporates some
elements of the subjective expectation analysis. For example,
courts using the context approach consider whether a company
gave adequate notice to its employees before surveillance be-
gan. Since notice affects employees' subjective expectations of
privacy, this factor seems inappropriate in analyzing wire com-
munications. However, courts can justify the use of such fac-
tors because the ordinary course of business exception is an
exception to the statutory definition of a wire communication.
The seminal case in the area, United States v. Harpel,7 3 sets
the minimum standard for workplace monitoring: employer
authorization and adequate notice. Harpel involved a criminal
prosecution under the Omnibus Act. Harpel was convicted of
disclosing a recorded telephone conversation between a police
department officer and federal drug agents.74 There was little
evidence regarding who made the recording or how the record-
ing was accomplished. In addition, neither the officer nor the
73. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
74. The recordings were played on two separate occasions at a local bar. IcE at 348.
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federal agents had consented to the recording. The primary is-
sue was whether the "extension phone" exception applied.
Harpel contended that no interception occurred if the record-
ing took place on an extension telephone connected to the po-
lice department lines. The court rejected this rigid application
of the "extension phone" exception, holding as a matter of law
that "a telephone extension used without authorization or con-
sent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation
is not used within the ordinary course of business. ' 75 Conse-
quently, a nonconsensual recording on an extension phone of
the officers' conversation was an illegal interception, and dis-
closure of the recording to others was not protected by the stat-
utory exception.
Courts using the context approach tend to stress a business's
interests in safeguarding its service quality or preventing unau-
thorized use of the company phone system. For example, in
James v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,76 a former employee of the
Newspaper Agency (the Agency) sued under the Omnibus Act,
alleging that the Agency had unlawfully intercepted wire com-
munications by installing a telephone monitoring system. The
Agency had requested the telephone company to install a moni-
toring device, which permitted the Agency to listen in on tele-
phone conversations between its employees and its advertisers
and others.7 The Agency was concerned about abusive lan-
guage by irate customers, and the need to give employees fur-
ther training and supervision in dealing with the public.
78
The court, using a contextual approach, noted that the in-
stallation was not done surreptitiously. All employees were ad-
vised in advance, in writing, of the installation; none pro-
tested.7 The court held that the installation was "squarely
within" the ordinary course of business exception.8° Because
the installation was not done secretly, all employees were noti-
fied, and the installation was for a legitimate business purpose;
the interception was in the ordinary course of business."1
Similarly, in Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,2
75. Id. at 351.
76. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).




81. Id at 582.
82. 452 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. OkIaL 1978), aff'i, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the court upheld a telephone company's monitoring of its em-
ployees who dealt with telephone complaints and customer in-
quiries. In this case, however, the court relied on the "common
carrier" exception . 3 The company had installed a monitoring
system in order to control employees' performance quality,
check work in progress, and supervise employees' contacts with
the public. The court found significant that in addition to noti-
fying employees about monitoring, the company made un-
monitored phones available for employee use.8 '
b. Content Approach
The content approach focuses on the nature of a call's con-
tent: "business' calls can be subject to surveillance; "personal"
calls cannot. However, this seemingly simple dichotomy has
one major problem: the nature of a particular call cannot be
ascertained until after it is subject to surveillance. There is no
way for the employer to determine before monitoring a call
whether it is business or personal.
For example, in Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens,s the
Eleventh Circuit decided that an employer's use of a recording
device did not violate the federal wiretapping statute. Appel-
lants, both hospital employees, engaged in a conversation over a
"ringdown line''s6 which connected two telephones, one at the
83. The Omnibus Act actually has two provisions that except wire and electronic
communication service providers (termed "common carriers" prior to the Privacy Act
amendments). The first exception provides that:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard,
or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communi-
cation service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire commu-
nication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire com-
munication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random
monitoring except for mechanical of service quality control checks.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1987). The second provision is the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception. It excepts the use of telephone equipment and facilities "used by a
communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business." I&
§ 2510(5)(a)(i). Florida's common carrier exception is more general than the federal
provision. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(4)(a) (West 1985). It simply recognizes common
carriers within the "ordinary course of business" exception. Id.
84. 452 F. Supp. at 396.
85. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
86. A button at the dispatch station caused the substation telephone to ring, how-
ever, the call passed first through Southern Bell's central office before arriving at the
substation. Incoming and outgoing calls originating at the dispatch station were auto-
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hospital's main dispatch station and the other at a downstairs
substation. A third employee in an adjacent room overheard
the appellants' conversation, which contained disparaging re-
marks about two dispatch supervisors. After listening for fif-
teen minutes, the second employee relieved the dispatcher on
duty and began recording the calla few minutes later. The ap-
pellants filed suit for actual and punitive damages under the
federal wiretapping statute, alleging that other employees lis-
tened to and disclosed the contents of the recording.
8 7
The appellants argued that the statutory exception did not
apply because the interception and recording of the conversa-
tion was not in the ordinary course of hospital business. In sup-
port of their assertions they demonstrated that: (1) it was
hospital policy to record automatically only calls coming into or
going out from the dispatch console; (2) hospital personnel
were not authorized to record any other calls; and (3) the em-
ployee recording the call was not an authorized dispatcher.s"
These factors indicate a contextual approach towards determin-
ing liability against the hospital. The hospital, however, argued
that the call was in the ordinary course of business because the
content of the conversation dealt with employee relations,
which were of direct concern to the hospital.89
In adopting the content approach, the court held that the call
was not personal because it occurred during office hours,
between co-employees, over a specialized extension, and con-
tained "scurrilous" remarks about supervisory employees
in their capacities as supervisors. 90 The court stated that
matically recorded. Calls on the ringdown line were not automatically recorded but
could be manually recorded. This distinction would preclude analysis under the "pri-
vate system" exception, which prevents application of the Omnibus Act's provisions to
privately operated in-house telecommunications systems. See, e.g., U.S. v. Christman,
375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (closed dial telephone system used only for
calls within store or to other stores of the same chain). See generally Note, supra note
30, at 451-52 (discussion of private system exception).
87. 802 F.2d at 414.
88. Id at 416.
89. Id. The hospital urged that the ringdown line was not a "facility" under the
definition of a "wire communication." I& at 414. The court held that the entire phone
system, not just the extension line, is a facility under the Omnibus Act; therefore, the
conversation was a wire communication. IM at 414-15. The appellants also argued
that the double reel recording device was an intercepting device not furnished by a
common carrier. Id. at 415. The court, however, did not accept this argument. Instead,
the court stated that "the intercepting device was the dispatch console. The console
intercepted the call. The double reel recorder recorded it." Id. at 415.
90. Id at 417.
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"[c]ertainly the potential contamination of a working environ-
ment is a matter in which the employer has a legal interest."91
The court concluded that the case fell within the "telephone
extension exception;" thus, the hospital was not liable. 2
In dissent, Judge Phyllis Kravitch disagreed with the major-
ity's analysis because it relied on the content of an employee's
conversation to determine whether it was within the ordinary
course of business.93 Judge Kravitch stated that there must be
a legitimate business purpose and authorization before an em-
ployer may intrude on an employee's privacy; the business pur-
pose must also exist at the time the conversation is recorded.9
Judge Kravitch's dissent illustrates a flaw in the content ap-
proach: how to determine the nature of a call's contents before
surveillance occurs. 5 The dissent's argument supports the use
of the contextual approach by urging that certain factors be
met. The dissent implicitly raises a second issue as well:
should courts decide whether the content of a particular con-
versation is business or personal after the fact?
The line between personal and business calls is at best amor-
phous. Some might argue that the majority in Epps improperly
concluded that an employee's "scurrilous remarks" should be
the basis for exempting an employer from wiretap liability, par-
ticularly when almost all the factors under the context ap-
proach were absent. The court could easily have held that the
employee's communication was not business-related, and thus
was protected under the Omnibus Act.
The Eleventh Circuit also took the content approach in Wat-
kins v. L.M Berry & Co.' Plaintiff Watkins, a sales represen-
tative for the Berry Company, solicited advertisements for the
Yellow Pages. Part of Berry's established training program in-
volved the monitoring of solicitation calls and reviewing them
with employees to improve sales techniques. Monitoring was
done with a standard extension telephone. Employees were
permitted to make personal calls on company telephones; how-
ever, they were told that personal calls would not be monitored
except to the extent necessary to determine whether a particu-
91. Id,
92. I&
93. I& (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 418.
95. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
96. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
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lar call was of a personal or business nature.
A friend called Watkins during lunch hour, and Watkins
mentioned a job interview she had with another company. The
conversation was being monitored by her supervisor, and Wat-
kins was fired. She brought suit against Berry and her supervi-
sor under the federal wiretapping statute.
The court stated the general rule: "[I]f the intercepted call
was a business call, then Berry Co.'s monitoring of it was in the
ordinary course of business. If it was a personal call, the moni-
toring was probably, but not certainly, not in the ordinary
course of business.' ' se The court rejected Berry's argument that
the monitoring was in the ordinary course of business simply
because the contents might be of interest to Berry. Though
Berry may have been interested in Watkins' interview and pos-
sible employment plans, it was of no legal interest to them:
"Her interview was thus a personal matter, neither in pursuit
nor to the legal detriment of Berry's business. ' '99 The court
ruled that "a personal call may not be intercepted in the ordi-
nary course of business.., except to the extent necessary to
guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to deter-
mine whether a call is personal or not.'' 10° In summary, the
court stated that "a personal call may be intercepted in the or-
dinary course of business to determine its nature but never its
contents."''1 1
The court also discussed two additional issues. First, Berry
had intercepted an incoming call, but Berry's business was to
place outgoing solicitation calls. The court said that if Berry
knew the intercepted call was incoming, the entire listening
would have been unlawful.10 2 Second, the court addressed the
issue of how long Berry could monitor Watkins' call after le-
97. Id. at 579.
98. Id at 582 (emphasis in original).
99. IM at 582.
100. I& at 583.
101. Id. The court stated that it was making the 'positive, affirmative statement"
Judge Thomas A. Clark had urged in his concurrence in Brngg& However, in Briggs
Judge Clark proposed a steadfast rule: private calls simply cannot be intercepted. 630
F.2d at 421. The Watkins court, therefore, did not adopt Judge Clark's view in its
entirety. Instead, it adopted a position substantially in accordance with the majority
in Briggs, with which Judge Clark took issue. (. 630 F.2d at 420 n.8.
102. 704 F.2d at 584 n.8. C. Op. Atty. Gen. Fla. 85-5 (Jan. 23, 1985) (municipal
police department may lawfully record incoming calls to department's lines but may
not lawfully record outgoing calls on such lines even if lines are equipped with audible
"beeper" signal).
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gaily entering the conversation. The court noted that the "ex-
pectation of privacy in a conversation is not lost entirely
because the privacy of part of it is violated."'1 3 The supervisor
"was obliged to cease listening as soon as she had determined
that the call was personal, regardless of the contents of the le-
gitimately heard conversation."'1°4 The court noted that other
cases allowing interceptions of ten to fifteen seconds were sen-
sible; however, one case upholding a three to five minute inter-
ception was troubling. 0 5 The limits of the exemption are
directly related to the company's policy and are questions for
the trier of fact.106
In the Fifth Circuit, Briggs v. American Air Filter Co. 107 con-
cerned an action brought for invasion of privacy under the Om-
nibus Act. The manager of American Air Filter suspected that
an employee was disclosing confidential information to a for-
mer employee who worked for a competing firm. The em-
ployee and former employee were friends prior to the
conversations at issue. The manager admonished the employee
not to discuss any of the company's business with the former
employee. However, the manager subsequently received infor-
mation from various sources that the employee was continuing
to discuss contracts with the former employee. Following a
confidential discussion of company business with the employee,
the manager was told by a secretary that the employee was
talking to the former employee on the phone. Both the em-
ployee and the manager were in their private offices. The man-
ager picked up his phone, an ordinary extension phone, and
recorded part of the conversation.
Both parties stipulated that the call was business-related,
though there was disagreement over whether the call con-
tained confidential information. The recording was done with
an attachment to a portable dictation machine which was "a
standard piece of equipment which had been provided when
the dictating machine was purchased.' 08 Neither the em-
ployee nor the former employee had been informed that their
call might be monitored, and neither had consented to being
103. 704 F.2d at 584.
104. 1&
105. Id. at 584-85. But see United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir.
1979) (operator monitoring call for three to five minutes permitted).
106. 704 F.2d at 584-85.
107. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).




American Air Filter counterclaimed for breach of loyalty.
The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor
and the employee appealed. On appeal, the court said the issue
was simply whether the manager's telephone was one that was
used in the ordinary course of business. Since the court found
it was, it held the telephone was not a "device" under the Om-
nibus Act.110 The court, concluding that Congress authorized
the interception of this type of communication, made three
points. First, the plaintiffs stipulated that the call was a busi-
ness call. Second, the manager's listening was limited in time,
and was for a specific business-related purpose. Thus, the court
did not have to address the issue of whether listening would
violate the act if the conversation had been "personal."'1 1
Third, the act of listening was not part of a general practice of
surreptitious monitoring. A general practice of listening, the
court held, would be more intrusive of employees' privacy than
monitoring limited to specific occasions. The court did not
reach the issue of whether a general practice of random moni-
toring of employee calls is justifiable under the Act. 12 The
court did note that the practice of listening may violate state
law.13
c. Content v. Context
The context approach provides clearer guidelines for employ-
ers than the content approach. By complying with the factors
highlighted in the cases above, employers can be certain that
their surveillance systems will not run afoul of the "ordinary
course of business" exception.
109. I&
110. I& at 417.
111. Id. at 420. However, in a footnote the majority indicated the difficulty it had
envisioning situations where the interception of non-business calls would be permissi-
ble. The majority then stated- "However, interception of calls reasonably suspected to
involve non-business matters might be justifiable by an employer who had difficulty
controlling personal use of business equipment through warnings." I& at 420 n.8.
Judge Thomas A. Clark, specially concurring, disagreed. He proposed a rule that mon-
itoring of personal calls would be impermissible, even under the majority's hypotheti-
cal. IdS at 421 (Clark, J., concurring). See supra note 101 for a further discussion of
this issue.
112. Id. at 420; but see James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1979) (monitoring of employee phone calls by supervisors was within the extension
phone exception) discussed upru notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
113. 630 F.2d at 420.
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However, there may be situations where, despite compliance
with the context approach's checklist, employers will monitor
or record a "personal" call. For instance, an employer with a
legitimate business purpose and actual employee notice might
monitor a personal phone call on a "business-only" phone.
Under the context approach, the employer's monitoring would
not be actionable. But, under the content approach, the em-
ployee could argue that the employer had no justifiable interest
in monitoring the contents of the call.
While the content approach would at first glance appear to
favor the privacy rights of employees, it may actually favor em-
ployers under the proper circumstances. For example, in both
Briggs and Epps the court determined that the employers had
an interest in the content of their employee's conversation.
The courts labeled the calls "business" and upheld the employ-
ers' activities. A contextual approach would have reached a dif-
ferent result because the businesses in both cases had failed to
meet procedural prerequisites, such as notice to employees.
Courts' use of the content approach is thus a two-edged sword.
The content approach may override the context approach in sit-
uations where employers, although complying with procedural
safeguards, overstep and invade employees' private communi-
cations. It can also favor employees, however, as evidenced by
the Epps and Briggs decisions.
3. Participant Consent Exception
Consent is a consideration independent of interception under
the Omnibus Act.114 The Omnibus Act exempts the intercep-
tion of wire, oral or electronic communications if (1) the person
intercepting the communication is a party to the communica-
tion, or (2) one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.'15 Therefore, recording or
114. United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir. 1974). The holding in
Harpel is peculiar because, although the court states that consent is a consideration
independent of interception, the court actually incorporates consent into the ordinary
course of business exception (which is within the definition of interception). In other
words, the consent exception does not require that a communication be "in the ordi-
nary course of business;" however, for a communication to be "within the ordinary
course of business" there must be the consent of at least one party.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1987) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such
person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such corn-
[Vol. 10:715
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monitoring one's own communications is permissible without
the consent of the other parties to the conversation. 116
Simply taping a telephone conversation does not violate the
Omnibus Act, provided at least one party consents." 7 Congress
intended to permit one party to record conversations with an-
other when the recorder is acting out of a legitimate desire to
protect himself"' by having an accurate recording of conversa-
tions to which he is a party."9 An interception is illegal if done
for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act, even
if the interceptor meets one of the participant consent ex-
ceptions.'"
In the business context, employers may seek to avoid liability
under the Omnibus Act by having employees consent to moni-
toring. Because of the current emphasis on privacy interests,
courts are hesitant to find actual or implied consent unless the
circumstances clearly indicate that employees were adequately
warned that their communications might be monitored or re-
corded. Accordingly, careful planning and implementation of a
company policy are necessary to achieve effective employee
consent.
munication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tor-
tious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.
Id
116. See, e.g., United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1971) (tape record-
ing with consent of a party to conversation does not violate Omnibus Act or fourth
amendment); Consumer Elec. Prods. v. Sanyo Elec., 568 F. Supp. 1194,1196 (D. Colo.
1983); Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (recording of private
telephone conversation by a party to it and its subsequent disclosure did not violate
Omnibus Act).
117. Consumer Elec. Prods. v. Sanyo Elec., 568 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Colo. 1983)
(noting that the burden of proof is on the party alleging an interception to show an
unlawful purpose). See also United States v. W. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 326 (8th Cir.
1976) (placing burden on party making interception to prove that interception was not
for unlawful purpose creates an "impossible burden" of proving negatives). But see
inja notes 188-97 and accompanying text (Florida state law requires that all parties
consent).
118. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,694 (1968) (Statement of Sen. Hart).
119. By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959-60 (7th Cir. 1982). See
also Moore v. Telfon Comm. Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Omnibus Act does not prohibit franchiser's recording of conversation with franchisee
for the purpose of preserving evidence of extortion for later use to support termina-
tion of franchisee).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1982). This provision modifies the original version,
which exempted all wire and oral communications from the Omnibus Act where one
party consented. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., re pinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADUMw. NEWS 2112, 2182.
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In Watkins v. LM. Berry & Co., 12 1 Watkins filed suit after
her employer monitored a personal call on a company phone.
Employees were permitted to make calls on company tele-
phones, and they were told that calls would only be monitored
to the extent necessary to determine whether it was personal
or business. In its defense, the employer urged that the partici-
pant consent exception applied because plaintiff's acceptance
of employment with knowledge of the established monitoring
policy constituted consent to the interception of the call.
The court found this argument erroneous with respect to
both actual and implied consent theories. The court stated:
It is clear, to start with, that Watkins did not actually consent
to interception of this particular call. Furthermore, she did not
consent to a policy of general monitoring. She consented to a
policy of monitoring sales calls but not personal calls. This
consent included the inadvertent interception of a personal
call, but only for as long as necessary to determine the nature
of the call."2
The court also declared that under the Omnibus Act "knowl-
edge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered
implied consent."'' 1 The court distinguished the situation here
from two others. First, courts will imply consent where the
plaintiff knew or should have known of a policy of constantly
taping calls. l 4 Second, courts will imply consent where a per-
sonal call is made on a telephone which the employee knows is
to be used exclusively for business calls and is regularly moni-
tored.12 Here, by contrast, the plaintiff consented only to lim-
ited monitoring of business calls.
121. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983). See also supra notes 96-106 and accompanying
text (further discussion of Watkins).
122. 704 F.2d at 581 (emphasis in original).
123. 1d. (emphasis in original). See also Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir.
1979). A prisoner whose phone conversation had been monitored argued that he had
not given prior consent. The defendants urged that the prisoner had given implied
consent because (1) the prisoner was in restricted custody, (2) the call was placed by a
staff officer, (3) the common practice in the prison was to monitor inmate calls, and
(4) inmates' general expectations are that calls are monitored. IM at 393. However,
the court held that the defendant's theory "completely distorted" the plain words of
section 2511(2)(c), which requires prior consent. ICE at 394.
124. 704 F.2d at 581. See, e.g., Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (police officer whose call was intercepted knew or should have known
that the line he used was constantly taped for police purposes).
125. 704 F.2d at 581-82. See, e.g., Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F.
Supp. 392 (W.D. Okla. 1978), qff'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff made per-
sonal call on phones designated for business use, after previously being warned, even
though other phones were specifically provided for personal use).
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The Omnibus Act does not grant non-employee callers any
right to notification that their communications are subject to
monitoring.'2 As long as one party consents, the participant
consent exception applies.' In essence, participant consent is
unilateral so the receiver may monitor calls without the caller's
knowledge.1'' This aspect of the Omnibus Act has led to vari-
ous proposals such as special designations in phone books12 and
state rules requiring the consent of all parties.130 However, no
federal standard has emerged.1 3 1
One suggestion for dealing with the employee and customer
notice problem is for employers that monitor workplace tele-
phones to use an audible periodic warning tone. Congress is
currently considering a so-called "beeper bill" that would
amend the Omnibus Act by implementing this type of protec-
tion. The bill provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision in the chapter, it shall
be unlawful for an employer (or an agent of an employer) to
listen in on an employee's work phone call unless a repeating
audible tone is utilized to warn parties to the call. Any person
whose call is listened in on in violation of this subsection may
recover civil damages as provided in section 2520 for an inter-
ception of communications in violation of this chapter."s
The bill has enormous implications. First, the bill's proviso
requires that it override any conflicting provisions in the Omni-
bus Act. For example, even if an intercepted communication
was "within the ordinary course of business," the employer
126. When recording is involved, however, FCC rules and phone company tariffs
require all party consent or beep-tones. See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying
text.
12. Of course, an employer who fails to notify an employee that a phone is subject
to monitoring may be sued by both the employee and the individual calling the em-
ployee. See Awbrey v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
128. This application of the participant consent provision, however, is symmetrical.
A caller may monitor his own call to a business or government agency without notify-
ing the business or agency.
129. See Electronic Surveillance, Report of the National Commission for the Re-
view of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
28(1976) (suggesting the FCC or state utility commissions consider requiring asterisks
beside names of companies engaging in service monitoring).
130. See infa notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
131. This lack of uniformity is a considerable concern for those who sell nationally
by telephone. See Higgins, To Tape or Not to Tape is Question for Telemarketers,
Marketing News, May 9, 1986, at 4 (telephone service representatives in legal limbo).
132. H.R. 1950, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1124, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
The bills are identical.
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would still have to use a beep-tone device. Similarly, the bill
would override the participant consent exception even if all
parties consented to the interception. Thus, the bill would ef-
fectively make much of the existing case law irrelevant.133
Furthermore, the employer would be liable for civil damages
not only to employee-parties but to any other parties to the
call.' 4 The bill expands privacy protection to all parties and
resolves any ambiguities regarding whether an employer is lia-
ble to non-employees for workplace violations.135 Also, the bill
is more expansive than current FCC regulations, which require
a beep-tone only when recording activities take place.13'
Finally, the bill applies only to work phone calls; personal
phone calls are not included. This language could cause
problems in those situations where a workplace phone is used
for both business and personal calls. For example, suppose an
employee uses a workplace phone for a personal call and the
beep-tone continues to chime. Is the employer liable for moni-
toring the call or is the employee implicitly consenting to the
possible monitoring? 3 7
The beep-tone might also detrimentally affect a speaker's
candor, brevity, and informality while reducing precision and
lucidity of thought."as A continual beep may also make custom-
ers feel uncomfortable or suspicious.' 9 In addition, the bill
might increase the operational costs of those employers who
continued to monitor workplace telephone communications.
4. Privacy Interests - Generally
A recurrent theme throughout the Omnibus Act case law is
the protection of privacy interests. This section highlights the
133. The monitoring and recording activities that courts upheld as being within the
ordinary course of business exceptions in the Newspaper Agency, Simmons, Epps, and
Briggs cases would be impermissible under the bill's provisions because the employer
did not use an audible beep tone.
134. Id
135. The bill limits liability to "civil damages as provided in section 2520 for an
interception of communications in violation of this chapter." Id. This section pro-
vides for recovery of damages (statutory, actual, and punitive), attorneys' fees and
litigation costs.
136. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. The bill refers to "listening in"
activities, which are much broader than just "recording." See infra notes 145-54 and
accompanying text.
137. This could be a particularly difficult problem when employers use automated
equipment which cannot distinguish between business and personal calls.
138. See R. Posner, supra note 2, at 245-47.
139. See Higgins, supra note 131, at 4.
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methods of determining what constitutes an expectation of pri-
vacy under the Omnibus Act.
Wire and electronic communications (telephone communica-
tions), unlike oral communications, are protected against inter-
ceptions by electronic, mechanical, and other devices regardless
of the speaker's expectation of privacy.14° Thus a speaker's pri-
vacy expectations would seem irrelevant in determining
whether a particular interception of a telephone communica-
tion is justifiable. However, privacy expectations are relevant
in determining whether a communication is within the "ordi-
nary course of business" exception (content approach), and in
looking at state tort law, which is examined in Part II of this
article.141
In monitoring or recording telephone conversations, an em-
ployer should take the greatest care not to tortiously invade the
privacy of one of the parties. One party may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy so that the interception, use or disclo-
sure of the conversation is actionable under the Omnibus Act
or state tort law. What constitutes a legitimate expectation of
privacy is unclear. For example, one federal court stated that
each willing participant in a conversation takes the risk that
another participant may divulge the contents of the conversa-
tion; if the conversation is divulged, either by memory of the
participant or by electronic reproduction, there is no violation
of any privacy right.!'
Both subjective and objective expectations of privacy deter-
mine whether an expectation of privacy is justified. This two-
part test is referred to in Katz v. U.S., which discusses what
constitutes an "oral communication" under the Omnibus Act.
The subjective expectation relates to whether a person's con-
duct exhibits an actual expectation of privacy;" the objective
standard inquires whether a person's subjective expectation is
one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 45
140. See spra note 38 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 154-212 and accompanying text.
142. United States v. W. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied,
429 U.S. 1000 (1977).
143. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
144. Id at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
145. I& See also State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 1985) (homicide
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, so the deceased's recording of
conversation and his own death was not in violation of Security of Communications
Act).
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Employers can directly affect the subjective expectations
part of the test. For example, an employer notifying employees
that phone communications are to be monitored or recorded es-
sentially minimizes any subjective expectation of privacy em-
ployees may have. However, a person's subjective expectation
of privacy in, for example, direct oral communications with
other employees is much different. In this situation, the em-
ployee expects the conversation to be private; eavesdropping
on this type of oral communication would probably violate the
Omnibus Act and state privacy laws."~ In fact, interception of
the same conversation occurring over a telephone line would be
unlawful unless the extension phone, ordinary course of busi-
ness, or consent exceptions applied.
Employers can also affect the objective standard, because it is
based on the reasonableness of the employee's subjective ex-
pectation. However, other extrinsic factors over which an em-
ployer has little control affect the reasonableness test. For
example, courts use factors such as the location and volume of a
conversation to determine reasonableness.147
B. Federal Communications Commission Orders
The FCC's orders and regulations provide another hurdle to
employers' recording of employees' business-related conversa-
tions. FCC orders are applied to thd general public through
tariff provisions x4 which make individual telephone companies
responsible for enforcing the Commission's rules against their
customers. For example, telephone companies subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction may terminate the telecommunica-
tions services of customers using recording devices in noncom-
pliance with Commission rules. A business's failure to comply
with telephone company warnings may result in the suspension
of the business's telecommunications service until the customer
complies with the tariff's provisions. "'I A telephone company
146. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
147. See cases cited in Note, supra note 30, at 444 n.39. Changing technology also
affects the expectation of privacy. Id. at 445-46.
148. FCC recording regulations are applied to telephone companies themselves by
Commission rule. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.501 (1987).
149. However, some courts have held, in the criminal context, that Commission
orders requiring a beep-tone are directed to telephone companies, not their custom-
ers. Ferguson v. U.S., 307 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1962) (course of federal prosecution
cannot be controlled by state law), opinion withdrawn on other grounds per curiam,
329 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D.Minn. 1973) (FCC beep-tone order contrary to Congres-
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that fails to enforce its tariffs could be subject to fines or the
amendment, suspension, or revocation of its service certificates.
The Commission promulgated its first rule regulating the re-
cording of phone conversations in 194 7 .se The Commission
adopted the rule to balance the legitimate public needs for re-
cording phone communications and the protection of individual
privacy interests. Recording of two-way telephone conversa-
tions over interstate or wide area telecommunications services
was permissible provided the recording party used a beep-tone
at periodic intervals to protect the privacy of telephone
communications. 151
Four years later, in 1951, the Commission became concerned
that recording was being done with devices over which phone
companies and the Commission had little control. The Com-
mission prohibited the recording of phone messages by acoustic
or inductive methods. Only the telephone companies could
make connections for recording calls because interconnection
of "foreign" attachments was prohibited by tariff.152 In 1981,
the Commission adopted mutual consent as a substitute, not a
replacement, for the beep-tone requirementlss If all parties to
a telephone conversation consent to recording of the communi-
cation, a beep-tone is not necessary.154
The Commission has continued to protect privacy interests in
telephone communications. However, the most recent Com-
mission order provides a third option: recording is permitted if
the recording party notifies the other party that it intends to
record the conversation.s Notice should be made at the begin-
ning, and as part of, the recorded portion of any call.15 This
sionally-enacted exceptions). This rationale suggests the maximum sanction busi-
nesses not complying with FCC orders may be subject to is termination of their
telecommunications services.
150. Use of Recording Devices, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C. 1033 (1947).
151. Id. at 1055, para. 3.
152. However, such tariff provisions are suspect following the 1968 Carterfone de-
cision in which tariffs restricting attachment of non-telephone company equipment
were found unlawful. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Ser-
vice, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
153. Recording Devices, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 848 (1983).
154. The Commission also identified three types of calls that may be recorded
without a beep-tone or consent: emergency, patently unlawful, and law-enforcement
related. I& at paras. 8-11.
155.. Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Service, Report and
Order, 2 F.C.C. Red. 502 (1987).
156. For example, suppose a caller informs a receiver that the caller intends to.
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option still requires all-party consent, but it does allow "im-
plied consent." For example, if after notification a receiver
continues to communicate over the phone, the caller may rec-
ord the conversation.
The FCC's order raises the jurisdictional issue of whether the
Commission is authorized to regulate this subject matter. The
Commission concluded in its order that Congress, in enacting
the Omnibus Act, did not intend to limit the Commission's ju-
risdiction over regulation in this area.157 Reasoning that the
Omnibus Act was primarily concerned with law enforcement
and other interests rather than privacy interests, the Commis-
sion ruled that it was authorized to protect privacy interests of
telephone users.'" There is no conflict between the Act and
the FCC rules since the privacy interests the Commission seeks
to protect are different from those the Omnibus Act protects.
The Commission seems motivated to protect the privacy in-
terests of phone users on both ends of a communication even in
the case where, for example, a business simply uses a recorda-
tion internally to improve its services to consumers. Essen-
tially, the FCC wants any party whose telephone com-
munication might be recorded to have consented or been given
adequate prior notice. This position places one individual's pri-
vacy interests paramount to all other individuals' interests in
all situations. However, it provides an additional, albeit some-
what ineffectual, safeguard over privacy interests in personal
and business communications.
II
State Law: The Florida Experience
Many states have piggybacked on the federal Omnibus Act
by enacting their own "little" Omnibus Acts, sometimes adopt-
ing the Omnibus Act's language verbatim. 59 Florida's experi-
record their phone conversation. The receiver does not consent but continues to com-
municate over the phone. Under the mutual consent requirement, the caller could not
record the conversation. However, under the new option, the caller has satisfied the
notice requirement and may record the conversation. The receiver has impliedly con-
sented to recordation. However, the option requires that notice be made "as a part
of" the recorded portions of the call. So, the caller is under a continuing duty to
notify the receiver throughout the conversation that recording is occurring.
157. I at para. 19.
158. Id.
159. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 42.20.300 to -.340 (1962 & Supp. 1987); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3001 to -3014 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4501
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ence is illustrative for a number of reasons. First, Florida has
protected individual rights on wiretap privacy issues, since its
constitution explicitly recognizes a right of privacy1s6  and a
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure (includ-
ing interceptions of private communications).' 6 ' Second, Flor-
ida's wiretapping statute parallels the Omnibus Act to a great
to -4509 (Supp. 1985); CAL PENAL CODE §§ 630 -637.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); COL.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-15-101 to -104 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a to -41t
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1979 & Supp. 1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1312 (West
1983 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-712 (1980 & Supp. 1987); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -411 (1984 & Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 99 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.539a-i (West
Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.23 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1981); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 179.410-.515 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 570-A-1 to -11 (1974 & Supp. 1985); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 156A-1 to -26 (1985 &
Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51-.66 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 176.2-.14 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Pur-
don 1983 & Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-5.1-1 (Supp. 1987); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 23A-35A-1 to -21 (1987 Supp.); TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon
Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -11 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-61 to -70
(1983 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030-.100 (1977 & Supp. 1987); W.
VA. CODE §§ 62-1D-1 to -16 (Supp. 1987); WiSc. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1985);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-601 to -611 (1987).
Some states have provisions that explicitly protect privacy rights in personal com-
munications. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to -31 (1975 & Supp. 1986) (defamation and
criminal eavesdrop as offenses against privacy); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1335 (1979 &
Supp. 1986) (violation of privacy); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3001-3010 (1983 & Supp. 1987)
(unlawful eavesdropping and surveillance); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 1979)
(electronic and mechanical eavesdropping violate citizens' health, safety and welfare);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526-010 to -.080 (Baldwin 1984) (eavesdropping and related
offenses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-8-213 (1987) (privacy in communications); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to -11 (1984) (abuse of privacy); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00-.35 (Mc-
Kinney 1984) (offenses against right of privacy); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-15-.02
to .04 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (defamation & interception of communications); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-17-470 (1976 & Supp. 1986) (eavesdropping).
Finally, a few states have provisions that prohibit the physical intrusion into a wire.
ILI- REV. STAT. ch. 134, §§ 15a, 16 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (interference with wire
messages and wiretaps, respectively); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (1986) (ten dollar daily
fine for unauthorized connection with telephone or telegraph); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-3-1324 (1982) (wiretapping).
160. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 provides:
Right of Privacy. Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise pro-
vided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law.
I&
161. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides, in pertinent part, that "the right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against the unreasonable
searches and seizures, and against unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions by any means, shall not be violated."
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degree. However, the Florida statute has a few significant dif-
ferences, notably the two-party consent requirement.
A. Florida Constitution
Some state constitutions contain provisions relating to indi-
vidual privacy rights.1 " For example, the Florida Constitution
creates an individual right of privacy, stating that "[e]very natu-
ral person has the right to be let alone and free from govern-
mental intrusion into his private life."1" This provision,
however, relates to interferences by public as opposed to pri-
vate actors. In addition, the provision applies only to "natural
persons," so corporations do not possess the right. One com-
mentator has speculated that the constitutional right extends
to "individual" activities but not "economic" activities.'
162. State constitutions create various types of privacy rights. The first category is
a general free-standing right of privacy. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed upon."); ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 8 (1982) ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law."); CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972) ("All peo-
ple are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, possessing and protecting property, and pur-
suing and attaining safety, happiness and privacy."); FLA. CONST. art. I § 23 (1970) (see
supra note 160); HAwAII CONST. art. I, § 6 (1985) ('The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est."); MONT. CONST. art II, § 10 (1985) ("'he right of the individual privacy is essen-
tial to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1966) ("No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or have his home invaded, without authority of law.").
A second category is a right of privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1986) ('The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasion of privacy, or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means."); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1975) ("Every person shall be secure
in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1971) ('The
right of the people to be secure in their houses, persons, papers, and offices against
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be
violated.").
Various state statutes provide for protecting general privacy rights. See, e.g., MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.62(7) (Callaghan 1982) ("An employer shall not gather or keep a rec-
ord of employee's associations, political activities, publications, or communications of
non-employment activity unless authorized by the employee, unless they occur on the
employer's premises, or during working hours, and disrupt the duties of the employee
or other employees.").
163. Id. § 23. During November 1980, Florida citizens passed this constitutional
amendment, which became effective in 1981 by a 60% vote. Note, Interpreting P1ot.
ida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 565, 565 n.1 (1981).
164. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 671, 742 (1978). But see Note, supra note 155, at 572.
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The Florida Constitution also prohibits "unreasonable inter-
ception of private communications by any means."'1" Because
this additional protection requires state action, its application
in the civil area is minimal."* However, this provision, as well
as the right of privacy provision, is important for their
messages: Florida has decided to explicitly protect private com-
munications and individual privacy rights from unreasonable
or unnecessary governmental interferences. But the protec-
tions afforded private communications from interferences,
whether reasonable or not, by private actors have not been ele-
vated to this constitutional level.
B. Florida's Security of Communications Act
Florida's Security of Communications Act' 7 parallels the
Omnibus Act to a great extent.1 6e It similarly prohibits the in-
terception, use, and disclosure of any wire or oral communica-
tion.6 9 Unlike the Omnibus Act, however, the Florida Act
requires all-party consent. 70 The Florida Act also creates a
civil cause of action allowing the recovery of actual and puni-
tive damages and attorney's fees.'7 ' These two provisions dra-
matically increase the protections available to an individual
whose communication is intercepted.
1. Federal Preemption
In Florida, courts have held that the Omnibus Act preempts
the wiretapping field, so that any state regulation must provide
safeguards at least as stringent as those set out in the Act.1'7 2
These cases are consistent with congressional intent. 73
165. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. See supra note 162 (complete clause).
166. At the time this article was written, only one case dealt with the telephone
communications clause. Yarbrough v. State, 473 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
held that a defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding num-
bers dialed into a commercial telephone system.
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01 to .10 (West 1985).
168. See Appendix, Diagram 2.
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (West 1985). Unlike in the Omnibus Act, "elec-
tronic communications" are not expressly included. C. Omnibus Act, supra note 39.
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 1985).
171. I& § 934.10. Minimum recovery of actual damages is computed at $100 per day
or $1,000 per incident, whichever is greater. Id at 934.10(1).
172. State v. Aurilio, 366 So. 2d 71'(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. McGillicuddy,
342 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
173. See S. REP. No. 1097,90th Cong., 2d Sess., repninted in 1968 US. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws. 2181.
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Presumably, Florida could more narrowly construe the ex-
tension phone and ordinary course of business exceptions than
have federal courts. In fact, one court has held that those por-
tions of Florida's Act authorizing the interception of wire or
oral communications are statutory exceptions to the federal
and state constitutional right of privacy, and as such, must be
strictly construed.174 The Florida Act's participant consent ex-
ception is the best example of a state provision more stringent
than the Omnibus Act.
2. Ordinary Course of Business Exception
The Florida Act contains an ordinary course of business ex-
ception similar to that in the Omnibus Act.1 15 As in the federal
statute, the exception is embedded in the definition of intercep-
tion devices.176 If the requirements of the statutory exception
are met, the device in question is not an intercepting device and
no violation occurs.
a. Case Law
In Lomelo v. Schult,' 77 the plaintiff sued over the defend-
ant's disclosure of a taped telephone conversation. The trial
judge dismissed the action based upon the defendant's argu-
ment that a wrongful disclosure action cannot be based upon a
recording where one party consents. The appellate court re-
versed, stating that while taping one's own telephone conversa-
174. Copeland v. State, 435 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 443
So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1983). An interesting issue is whether an employee could successfully
pursue an invasion of privacy tort theory even though a workplace communication is
determined to be within the ordinary course of business exception contained in the
Florida Act. The issue, refrained, might inquire whether the Florida Act supersedes
existing tort law or provides protection equal to or greater than existing tort law.
However, the intent element may vary between tort and statutory law. No case law
addresses these issues.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(4)(a) (1985).
176. An "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means
any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral commu-
nication other than: (a) Any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment,
or facility or any component thereof furnished to the subscriber or user by a
communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business, or
being used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its
business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary
course of his duties.
Id
177. 422 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
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tion may not be a violation of the statute,178 playing the tapes
to other persons gave rise to a cause of action. Thus, a business
may internally use lawfully recorded communications, but the
external release of such recordings may violate the disclosure
provisions of the Florida Act or constitute an invasion of
privacy.
Aside from Lomelo, very few civil actions have been brought
in Florida under the extension phone and ordinary course of
business exceptions. However, the principles Florida courts
have enunciated in criminal cases may extend to civil cases as
well.
The ordinary course of business exclusion in Florida's wire-
tapping statute was applied in State v. Nova, 79 where a defend-
ant charged with homicide sought to exclude the testimony of
the victim's work supervisor.so The supervisor listened to a
phone conversation between the defendant and the victim-em-
ployee following a telephone call earlier that same day from
the defendant which had left the victim-employee visibly up-
set.'81 The trial court concluded that the supervisor was acting
in her capacity as supervisor when she listened to the second
call. The supervisor had acquired the consent of the victim-em-
ployee, and the call was received on a company telephone.
Thus, the court found that it was reasonable for the supervisor
to listen on the extension phone in order to find out why the
victim-employee was so upset. The supervisor's use of the
phone was for the benefit of her employee and was in the ordi-
nary course of business.lus The supervisor's testimony was ad-
missible under the "ordinary course of business" exclusion.'"
This interpretation of the Florida Acts' "ordinary course of
business" exception is different from federal courts' interpreta-
178. Since taping one's own conversations could violate Florida's all-party consent
requirement, the court presumably inferred that each party had given consent.
179. 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
180. Exclusion was sought pursuant to FL. STAT. ANN. § 934.06 (West 1985),
which prohibits the use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications. The
determinative issue in the instant case was whether the "ordinary course of business"
exclusion in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(4)(a) was applicable. 361 So.2d at 413.
181. 361 So. 2d at 413.
182. Id. This finding was contradictory to the District Court's determination that
the supervisor was merely satisfying her curiosity when she decided to listen in. Id.
The Supervisor, who found it "funny" that the 53-year-old defendant would con-
stantly call the 22-year-old victim-employee, had even stated "I just wanted to know
who was calling her." Id.
183. Id
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tions of the Omnibus Act's similar provision. First, the supervi-
sor's act of listening was not part of a company monitoring
policy. It was an independent act similar to that in Briggs.
While in Briggs, neither party to the conversation had given
consent to the recording, here, the employee consented to mon-
itoring of the call. Thus, consent would seem to be the disposi-
tive point. Second, the court relied on the purpose for which
the "interception" was made (i.e. for the benefit of the em-
ployer) to decide the call was in the ordinary course of business.
This factor supports the use of monitoring or recording as a
means of furthering legitimate business purposes such as those
described in the Epps and Briggs cases.
In State v. Tsavaris,' the court held that there was no "in-
terception" within the meaning of the Florida Act when a
detective listened to a telephone conversation on a speaker
phone without the knowledge of the caller.185 However, the
court held that recording a phone conversation without the
consent of all parties is prohibited.'
The court's analysis is primarily contextual because it focuses
on the type of equipment used and the consent of the receiver.
However, undue emphasis on the type of equipment used,
rather than on the privacy interests involved, is misplaced.187
In Horn v. State, 1 8' the testimony of a nurse's aide who had
listened in on a phone conversation between a nurse and her
husband was inadmissible in the criminal prosecution of the
husband for his wife's murder. 89 Neither of the parties con-
sented, and there was no authority from the nursing home to
engage in phone monitoring.'xg The court stated the general
rule that all such unauthorized interceptions on extension
phones are criminal violations.19' The court's analysis was
184. 382 So. 2d 56 (Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla.
1983).
185. 394 So. 2d at 420.
186. Id at 421.
187. See, e.g., Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979).
188. 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
189. Id. The aide admitted being "nosey" when she lifted an extension receiver to
listen to the call without the parties' knowledge.
190. Id. at 196-97. See also Arizona v. Dwyer, 585 P.2d 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (a
telephone operator who listened to a conversation between the defendant and victim
for 15 minutes due to curiosity was not acting within the ordinary course of business).
191. The court revealed the target of its dicta, stating. "It may well have been that
in the less complicated era of days gone by party-line eavesdropping furnished an ac-
ceptable method of entertainment for bored housewives and others lacking in suffi-
[Vol. 10:715
WORKPLACE WIRETAPPING
purely contextual because it relied on a steadfast rule requiring
at least one party's knowledge and notice of the monitoring.
However, a content approach would support admission of the
nurse's aide's testimony. 92 Under the Nova and Epps ratio-
nales, the employer in Horn would certainly have an interest in
monitoring the type of call here. If a business has an interest in
preventing "scurrilous" remarks in the workplace, it would
seem to have an interest in preventing or later solving the mur-
der of one of its employees. However, the primary factor that
distinguishes Horn from Nova and Epps is the lack of any evi-
dence that there was an ex ante reason for the monitoring. In
Nova, a fellow employee noticed that another employee was
"visibly upset" after an earlier call. In Epps, a fellow employee
overheard the remarks that the court later determined were
business-related and thus subject to recording. In Horn, there
was no evidence of any ex ante justification for the monitoring
of the call between the deceased and her husband; the nurse
who listened-in on the call was simply being "nosey."
3. Participant Consent Exception
Prior to 1974, the Florida Act contained a participant consent
exception similar to that in the Omnibus Act."s This exception
provided:
It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication
when such person is a party to the communication or when one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless such communication is intercepted for
the purpose of committing any criminal act.' 4
This provision would have allowed parties to "intercept" their
own communications without the consent of the other parties
to the communication. One example would be recording busi-
ness or personal conversations for later private use.1 a
A 1974 amendment replaced this provision, stating that "[i]t
is lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or
cient occupations or avocations of their own. However, those days are gone! We now
have radio and television." 298 So. 2d at 199.
192. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussion of Epps).
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 1985); Q. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1987).
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 1985).
195. See By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1982) (a person's
desire to make an accurate recording of a conversation to which she is a party is a
lawful purpose under the Omnibus Act).
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oral communication when all of the parties to the communica-
tion have given prior consent to such interception."'" Thus,
the Florida Act no longer allows one-party consent: all parties
to a wire or oral communication must consent for the intercep-
tion to be lawful. The statute's implicit premise is that each
party has an "expectation of privacy from interception by an-
other party to the conversation."' The Florida legislature has
shown a greater concern for protecting privacy interests in
communications than Congress did in the Omnibus Act.'
The all-party consent provision has survived intense constitu-
tional challenge. In Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp.,'"
media companies claimed the provision violated the first
amendment by impairing news-gathering activities.m The me-
dia said the statute inhibited the three basic goals of investiga-
tive reporting: accuracy, candidness, and corroboration. The
Florida Supreme Court held that the first amendment did not
invalidate Florida's statutorily recognized privacy right."° The
court concluded by saying, "The First Amendment is not a li-
cense to trespass or to intrude by electronic means into the
sanctity of another's home or office."12 2
No court has directly addressed the issue whether the gll-
party consent requirement applies in situations where the re-
quirements of the ordinary course of business exception are
met.2° 3 The strongest argument, based on strict statutory con-
struction, is that the "ordinary course of business" exception is
just what it says it is: an exception independent of all other
exceptions including the all-party consent requirement. It
makes little sense to consider either of these two exceptions
true exceptions if both must concurrently be fulfilled.
196. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 1985)
197. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 726-27 (Fla. 1977).
198. State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418, 422 (Fla. 1981).
199. 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977).
200. (. State v. News-Press Publishing Co., 338 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (discussed infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text).
201. 351 So. 2d at 726-27.
202. Id. at 727.
203. Diagram 2 in the Appendix demonstrates the problem. The path marked with
a "?" depicts the situation where the ordinary course of business exception is met (i.e.
no interception), yet participant consent would be required. This same issue has not
arisen under the federal Omnibus Act primarily because Harpel and other cases have
implicitly incorporated a one-party consent requirement into the ordinary course of
business exception. See supra note 61. In a similar manner, Florida courts could in-
corporate Florida's all-party consent requirement into the Florida Act's ordinary
course of business exception.
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A few contrary arguments exist. The first focuses on the se-
mantic differences between "interception" and "reception."
One party to a two-party conversation does not "intercept" that
communication, he simply receives it.' However, the 1974
amendment requires the receiver to get the consent of the
other party before "intercepting" the communication. Thus
"interception" as defined in the participant consent part of the
statute really means "reception." Consequently, even in situa-
tions where there is only a "reception," the participant consent
exception must be met. Thus, all-party consent becomes a req-
uisite and cumulative provision under the Florida Act because
every communication is, at a minimum, a "reception." A court
addressing this issue might simply rewrite the statute by in-
serting "reception" into the participant consent exception
where the term "interception" now appears.2°w
A second argument is that the legislative intent to protect
individuals' privacy rights in their communications would be
thwarted by allowing an exception for business communica-
tions. Why should business communications be exempt when
other communications currently fall within the exception's
protected ambit?
This issue was implicitly raised in State v. News-Press Pub-
lishing Company,-°6 which involved the anomalous situation of
a newspaper urging that its reporter's surreptitious recordings
were illegal because the newspaper was indicted for destruction
of evidence.2°" The evidence in question involved two tape re-
cordings the reporter had erased following two non-consensual
recordings. One recording occurred when the reporter left her
recorder running without informing the two persons whose
conversation was recorded. The other was a phone conversa-
tion between the reporter and another person recorded without
that person's consent. The state, the newspaper and the court
agreed that recording the first conversation was illegal.2 08
204. Chiarenza v. State, 406 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fi. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Inciar-
rano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 388 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), revd in part, 473 So. 2d
1272 (Fla. 1985).
205. The term "reception" does not appear in the statute. Also, the legislature's
failure to use the more expansive term "reception" in modifying the participant con-
sent exception could be intended to preserve the viability of the Florida Act's other
exceptions.
206. 338 So. 2d 1313 (FIa Dist. CL App. 1976).
207. 1d. at 1314-15.
208. Id. at 13i5.
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However, the state argued that the second recording was not
illegal because no interception occurred.2ce The court rejected
this argument, holding that the recording was illegal. 10
Apparently, neither party argued the ordinary course of busi-
ness exception.211 So the court addressed only the participant
consent exception.1 2 In addition, the court's analysis was
flawed because it relied on the definition of an "oral communi-
cation" in analyzing whether the recording of a telephone con-
versation - a "wire communication" - was illegal.1  Finally,
the context of News-Press is different from the ordinary
telemarketing situation.2 1 4 Nevertheless, the court's tenor was
clear: the legislature intended each party to a communication
to have an expectation of privacy from interceptions by other
parties.2 15 This theme is repeated in other Florida cases,2 16 so
it seems likely that arguments for applying participant consent
requirements to business communications will prevail in
Florida.
C. Phone Company Tariffs
State regulation of telecommunications gives further protec-
tion to privacy interests. In Florida, telecommunications com-
panies regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission are
required to include in their service tariffs restrictions against
certain practices. In Southern Bell's current service tariff, cus-
tomers are permitted to use voice recording equipment only
when specific criteria are met.217 First, the user of the record-
ing equipment must be able to activate or deactivate the equip-
ment at will. Second, the customer must acquire some form of
consent from all parties to the recorded conversation. The cus-
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1316.
211. The newspaper was not an effective advocate for the business community be-
cause it wanted to disassociate itself from the employee's activities by arguing that
they were illegal.
212. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351'So.2d 723 (Fla. 1977) would probably
override an argument based on the ordinary course of business exception. This assess-
ment follows because in Sunbeam Television the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
media's arguments, which relied on federal constitutional authority (i.e., the first
amendment), not a statutory exception.
213. 338 So. 2d at 1316.
214. Id. (court took notice of the case's unusual circumstances).
215. Id at 1316.
216. See, e.g., Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977).
217. General Subscriber Service Tariff, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Company, A.15.1.1(D) (June 16, 1986).
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tomer may do this in three ways: (1) prior consent may be ob-
tained in writing;, (2) prior consent may be part of, and obtained
at the start of, the recording; or (3) a distinctive recorder tone
repeated at intervals of about fifteen seconds may be used to
alert parties when recording equipment is in use. The tariff
also contains some exceptions generally unrelated to business
monitoring.218
Under the tariff agreement, individual phone companies are
responsible for enforcing the tariff provisions against their cus-
tomers. If Southern Bell learns that one of its customers is us-
ing recording equipment in violation of the tariff agreement,
Southern Bell must take immediate action by promptly asking
the customer to discontinue the use of the equipment or correct
the violation. Within ten days of notification, the customer
must confirm in writing that he has complied with the com-
pany's request. Telecommunications service is suspended until
the customer complies with the tariff's provisions.2 19
A telephone company that fails to enforce its tariffs could be
subject to fines or the amendment, suspension, or revocation of
its service certificates. The Commission has the power to order
the company to enforce the tariff's provisions. The Commis-
sion may also impose a penalty of up to $5000 for violation of
the Commission's orders.2 °
Ih summary, phone tariffs impose an additional hurdle on
the recording of telephone communications. Current tariff pro-
visions in Florida parallel those the FCC imposes, requiring
some form of all-party consent. The tariffs, through economic
pressures, compel the telephone companies to safeguard the
privacy interests of their customers from non-consensual
recordings.
Conclusion
Both the monitoring and recording of telephone communica-
tions are permissible if done within certain guidelines. FCC
regulations, phone company tariffs, and state rules such as
Florida's all-party consent requirement all hinder the record-
ing of phone communications. Failure to adequately fulfill the
218. ld at A.15.1.1 (D)(3).
219. I at A.15.1.1 (E).
220. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.285 (West 1985) (telephone companies); Id. § 350.127
(regulated companies generally).
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dictates of federal or state law not only subjects a violator to
civil and possibly criminal sanctions, but also does damage to its
public and personnel relations. Thus, businesses should de-
velop plans that strictly adhere to federal and state guidelines.
A. Monitoring
A business is permitted to monitor phone communications
transmitted from or received on its phone system under the or-"
dinary course of business exceptions contained in both federal
and Florida law. However, there must be a legitimate business
need for the monitoring. Examples of legitimate business pur-
poses are (1) prohibiting the unauthorized use of telephones,
(2) protecting the company from disclosure of confidential in-
formation, (3) dealing with irate and abusive customers, and (4)
supervising and training new employees in dealing with the
public.
Two other rules, however, also apply. First, employees
should be directly notified. Surreptitious monitoring is not per-
mitted under any circumstances. Constructive notice is likely
to be ineffective because it does not reduce employees' subjec-
tive expectations of privacy. Instead, the employer should give
written notice, preferably signed by the employee. Under fed-
eral law, one-party (i.e., employee) consent is sufficient for
monitoring to occur. Under Florida law, however, resolution of
the issue is more difficult because of the state's all-party con-
sent requirement. The Nova221 and Tsavaris22 2 cases suggest
that only one-party consent is required under the ordinary
course of business exception. However, the Sunbeam Televi-
sion 2 and News Press"2 4 cases provide strong arguments to the
contrary. A Florida court confronted with this precise issue
will have to consider whether following the Florida trend to-
wards expanding privacy protections effectively destroys the
ordinary course of business exception. Perhaps the Florida
courts would carve out exceptions similar to those federal
courts have recognized.
Second, monitoring personal calls is generally prohibited.
This area is the most perilous. The fundamental rule is that a
221. 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
222. 382 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla.
1983).
223. 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977).
224. 338 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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business may monitor calls that are "reasonably related to a
business purpose." A call's content is important. If the content
is business-related, most courts allow the call to be monitored.
Personal calls may be intercepted to guard against unauthor-
ized use of the telephone or to determine whether a call is
personal or not. If a call is determined to be personal, the inter-
ception must be terminated within a brief time (about fifteen
seconds).
However, a prudent policy to monitor only those communica-
tions that are clearly within the core of business-related com-
munications. For example, one casem held that an employer
had no legal interest in an employee's conversation with a
friend over the employee's prospects of employement else-
where. An employer may feel such information is business-re-
lated, but it is also protected under the employee's privacy
rights. Examples of core business communications would in-
clude disclosures of company secrets and communications di-
rectly related to a company's business transactions and dealings
with the public.
B. Recording
Recording is permitted under basically the same guidelines
that apply to monitoring, with one large difference. FCC rules,
phone company tariffs, and state laws like Florida's all-party
consent requirement do not provide for one-party consent to
recording. Under FCC rules, telephone communications may
be recorded if there is (1) a beep tone, (2) consent of all parties,
or (3) notification. None of these options would be favorably
received by consumers calling a business seeking information
or assistance. Phone company tariffs and Florida's all-party
consent requirement also inhibit candor, spontaneity, and
openness of communication.
It is uncertain whether an employer can record communica-
tions under the ordinary course of business exception without
all-party consent. One argument is that once the ordinary
course of business exception applies, the all-party consent re-
quirement does not apply. Even if this argument prevails, the
FCC and phone company tariffs are remaining hurdles.
Under the Florida Act, the subscriber does not have the op-
tion of obtaining recording equipment from sources other than
225. Watklns v. L M. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
1988]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
the phone company. However, under one federal case, Epps,2"'
recording equipment was held not to be an "intercepting"
device. 2 7 Under the rationale of Epps, only the intercepting
device (the telephone) must be acquired from the communica-
tions provider. A prudent strategy for Florida businesses
would be to purchase or lease recording equipment from the
telecommunications service provider. 28
C. Instituting Safeguards to Protect the Employer
A cautious employer should implement certain safeguards
before monitoring or recording calls. The following are four
suggestions.
First, directly inform all employees that call monitoring or
recording will be occurring. This notice forewarns employees
of the surveillance and minimizes any expectation of privacy
they may have on company phones. The notice should thor-
oughly describe (i) the time periods during which monitoring
or recording can occur; (ii) the particular phones the company
plans to monitor or record; and (iii) whether incoming or outgo-
ing calls will be monitored or recorded.
Second, institute procedures outlining (i) the persons who
may conduct monitoring and recording activities; (ii) the meth-
ods by which monitoring or recording may be done; and (iii) the
circumstances in which monitoring or recording may be done.
Procedures for monitoring or recording personal calls should
be particularly definitive. The employees conducting monitor-
ing or recording activities must be directed to terminate inter-
ception of a personal call, regardless of the call's contents,
within the briefest period of time necessary to identify the call
as personal. Once a call is determined to be personal, the inter-
ceptor must hang up.229 However, if employees are informed
that the entire content of all conversations is recorded, the em-
ployees' consent requirement is probably met.
Third, company policy should specify the purposes for the
monitoring or recording to prevent any inference that the com-
pany is engaging in "eavesdropping" without identifiable rea-
226. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussed supra notes 85-95).
227. 1& at 415.
228. However, some other states have provisions similar to the Omnibus Act which
allow users to purchase their own equipment. See supra note 158.




sons. The policy should also establish guidelines for
documenting an employee's unauthorized use of company
phones. Employers seeking to discipline or terminate employ-
ees for violations of company policy must possess substantial
documentation to support sanctions or discharge, particularly
when a wiretapping claim is likely to result. Additionally, the
use or disclosure of the contents of monitored or recorded com-
munications could result in tort liability for invasion of privacy
where the use or disclosure is unlawful or unrelated to a legiti-
mate business purpose.
Finally, whenever possible, employees should be provided
with a phone for personal calls that is insulated from the moni-
toring and recording systems.230 This segregation of phones
minimizes the issue of whether a call is "business" or "per-
sonal"; at least there is greater justification for an employer
monitoring or recording any call on the "business" phones in
such a situation because employees would have little reason to
use the business phone for personal purposes.
230. See Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 395-96
(W.D. Okla. 1978), qff'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979) (court found it significant that
unmonitored phones were available).
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Appendix
Diagram 1
Liability Under the Omnibus Act
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Diagram 2
Liability Under the Security of Communications
Act
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